Political pluralism: a means to defuse the growth of militant challengers

By Waleed Hazbun

This is a far more difficult challenge. Defenders of pluralism must support the right of political mobilisation by all forces, even those who reject pluralism. Pluralists, at the same time, must also seek to prevent such forces from imposing their will on others and stamping out pluralism. This delicate balance is one that has escaped many Arab states, resulting in the rise of authoritarian regimes which view pluralism as a threat to the national interest, rather than as an expression of the nation's complex and at times contradictory political identities.

The effort to crush the forces of Sadr might seem legitimate to supporters of democracy based on the cleric's recourse to violence and his movement's political goals which are likely hostile to religious and political pluralism in Iraq. He does, however, represent a political viewpoint which grows as more Iraqis become disgruntled by the US occupation. Pluralists must defend his movement's right to a political voice while rejecting violent means to this end. The US-occupation, however, has not made room for this option.

While Sadr and the US reaction to him might represent one set of threats to political pluralism in Iraq, another threat has been building within the Sunni Arab regions where attacks on American forces continue. These communities have been politically marginalised by the US occupation. They have few influential leaders or organised political movements able to speak for them and represent their interests within the still US-dominated Iraqi political system.

One factor driving both these challenges is that the Iraqis have yet to form their own national political system which defines how political interests can and should be pursued at the national level. So far, the US has been making up and enforcing a system of tokenism and shadow government to serve its own security and political interests. In the meantime, many Iraqi political forces have been mobilising outside of this US-control political space.

It is time for the US and its allies to declare this policy a failure. Many Iraqis have been willing to play along with this system for the time being, but that does not mean that they view it as legitimate. Recent polls show that most Iraqis do not feel represented by the existing Iraqi Governing Council and the leading political forces with close ties to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Moreover, any new Iraqi government will only be viewed as legitimate across Iraq if it shows some degree of independence from Washington and responds to the diverse interests and needs of the Iraqis who have been marginalised in the current system.

The Bush administration must quickly reconsider its policy of using increasing military force to impose and protect its own template for what Bush calls a “free” Iraq. In doing so, the United States risks becoming responsible for installing a weak, externally dependent government which fails to represent the full diversity of Iraq in a politically meaningful way. Not only will such a system fail to establish broad-based political pluralism, but this strategy will likely provoke the further mobilisation of militant elements within Iraq and possibly destabilise any government set up in Iraq on July 1.

As the US begins to consider UN-proposed models for a post-June 30 government, a far more critical question than who the executives at the top will be is what form of civil society and national politics will develop connecting the state to the larger, extremely diverse, society. A top priority, long overdue, should be to institutionalise political diversity and pluralism through the formation of officially recognised political parties and diverse representative bodies. These could define a wide range of political forces prepared to contest elections when they are held.

While these groups should be officially recognised, they must be self-defined by Iraqis, based on their own political views, rather than appointed on a sectarian or personal basis, like the IGC. These groups then must be given roles in a national debate about Iraq's future.

The US should not delay this process for fear that the “wrong” political movements would come to prominence in such a process. This is the risk which defenders of pluralism must take.

The US-led occupation forces need to give all political movements in Iraq political, rather than violent, means to promote their interests and rival visions for the new Iraq. The longer such a process is delayed the more likely it is that militant forces will gain broader popularity and mobilise as militias seeking to gain local territorial control through force and intimidation rather than competing for national political influence.

This policy, of course, will not insure that Iraq will become a liberal democracy overnight. Such a system can only come about as a product of internal Iraqi politics. But if no national political process is instituted and an unrepresentative government takes power, political instability and discontent may increase. This may make more politically marginalised Iraqis willing to support religious or military autocratic movements which promise to enforce public order and security but which, at the same time, will likely eliminate all hope for political pluralism.

The writer teaches international relations at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.

Friday-Saturday, April 23-24, 2004